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BESHADA v. JOHNS-MANVILLE
PRODUCTS CORP.: EVOLUTION OR
REVOLUTION IN STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY?
CHRISTOPHER M. PLACITELLA* AND
ALAN M. DARNELL**
INTRODUCTION
F EW if any areas of the common law have evolved as quickly and
dramatically as that of the law of products liability. Over the
course of the last two decades, courts have consciously eroded the
impediments to imposing liability on a manufacturer or distributor
that places a defective product into the stream of commerce which
ultimately injures the user or consumer.
Until the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp.,I one such impediment to the imposition of
liability was the state-of-the-art defense.2 This defense can immunize
a manufacturer or distributor from liability for product defects of
which it could not have been aware at the time of marketing. 3 In
rejecting the use of this defense in a strict products liability case, the
Beshada court distinguished the theories of strict liability and negli-
gence. 4 Drawing on a trilogy of its own recent decisions in which the
* Associate, Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, Woodbridge, New Jersey, B.S. 1978,
Fordham University; J.D. 1981, Syracuse University.
* * Member, Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, Woodbridge, New Jersey, B.S. 1968,
University of Rochester; J.D. 1971, University of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Darnell argued for appellants in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,
90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). Mr. Placitella joined with him on the brief.
1. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
2. See Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex.
1980).
3. The state-of-the-art defense should be distinguished from the defense that
allows the manufacturer to prove that the technology that would prevent a certain
risk of harm was unavailable at the time a product was produced. This latter defense
is sometimes also referred to as the state-of-the-art defense. See 2 L. Frumer & M.
Friedman, Products Liability § 16A[4][i], at 3B-176.2 to -176.4 (1982); Keeton, The
Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo.
L. Rev. 579, 594-95 (1980). This latter defense could be invoked, for example, if the
only means for reducing or preventing a risk of harm inhering in the use of a piece of
machinery was to incorporate a laser beam to activate an automatic shutoff device.
The defendant could prove that such technology was not available at the time the
product was manufactured or distributed.
4. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 208-09, 447 A.2d 539,
548-49 (1982).
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same distinction was made, 5 the court firmly fixed the theory of strict
liability in a position between the theories of negligence and absolute
liability.
Contrary to the assertions of some commentators,8 the holding and
principles enunciated by the court in Beshada are not revolutionary
but merely evolutionary. Accordingly, this Article suggests that criti-
cism leveled against the Beshada decision is the result of misdirected
fears of the practical implications of faithfully and forcefully applying
well-recognized principles of strict products liability.
I. THE ORIGINS OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Before the advent of strict products liability, plaintiffs who brought
actions against manufacturers or distributors for injuries caused by
defective products sued on theories of negligence and breach of war-
ranty.7 Prevailing under these theories, however, often proved to be
an insurmountable task. Plaintiffs whose actions were predicated on
negligence were frequently unable to demonstrate that the defendant
had failed to act reasonably in marketing its product or were barred
from recovery because of their own contributory negligence.8
When suing under a warranty theory, a plaintiff had to show that
the product was unreasonably constructed or unreasonably designed
for its intended use.9 Until the New Jersey Supreme Court opinion in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., l ° courts typically required
that the plaintiff be in privity of contract with the defendant before he
could initiate a suit for breach of warranty. Even after Henningsen
removed the privity requirement," however, the law of sales still
presented certain obstacles to recovery on a warranty theory. 12
5. Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229, 239, 432 A.2d 925, 930 (1981);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 169, 406 A.2d 140, 149
(1979); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 171-72, 386 A.2d 816, 825
(1978), overruled on other grounds, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81
N.J. 150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979).
6. Birnbaum & Wrubel, N.J. High Court Blazes New Path In Holding a Manu-
facturer Liable, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 24, col. 1; Platt & Platt, Moving from
Strict to 'Absolute'Liability, id., Jan. 17, 1983, at 18, col. 3; Berry, The Implications
of Beshada for Products Liability Actions: The Defense Viewpoint, 5 Dictum 6
(N.J.B.A. Young Law. Div., Nov. 1982).
7. Interagency Task Force on Products Liability: Final Report (1978), reprinted
in 5 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, at 681-82 app. G.
8. Id. at 681.
9. Id.
10. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
11. Id. at 413-14, 161 A.2d at 99-100.
12. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code requires that notice to the seller
be supplied within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers a defect in the
product. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1977).
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In 1963, the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.,'13 took a giant step forward in the evolution of
products liability law by creating a new theory of recovery in tort.
According to Greenman, a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when
it markets a defective product that ultimately causes personal injury to
a reasonably forseeable user or consumer. 14
A. Is the Product Defective?
For a plaintiff to succeed on a products liability claim, whether
based on negligence, breach of warranty or strict liability, he must
prove that the product was defective.' 5 Basically, two categories or
combinations of conditions may render a product defective-"manu-
facturing" and "design" defects.' 6 Manufacturing defects, which are
beyond the scope of this Article, 17 occur through error in the manufac-
turing or assembly process.' 8 Design defects are those arising out of the
dangers inherent in the product itself.' 9 In a design defect case, even
13. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
14. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The theory of strict products
liability was first suggested by Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). The
pronouncement of this doctrine had to await the Greenman case, however, in which
Justice Traynor wrote for a unanimous court. During the following decade, the
Greenman rule was made applicable to retailers, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61
Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964), bailors and lessors, Price v. Shell
Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970), wholesalers and
distributors, Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr.
552 (1965), and sellers of mass produced homes, Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269
Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969). For ease of discussion, the use of the term
"manufacturers" in this Article encompasses all other parties in the chain of distribu-
tion.
15. See 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, § 11.01[1], at 198.12; 2 id. §
16.03[4][a], at 3A-58; id. § 16A[4][e][i], at 3B-88.
16. Some commentators suggest that defects due to a failure to warn constitute a
third category distinct from design defects. See 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra
note 3, § 16A[4][f][i], at 3B-118.2 to -118.3.
17. When a strict products liability claim is predicated on a manufacturing
defect, the plaintiff must show that the product "deviated either in some material
way from the manufacturer's specifications or performance standards or from other-
wise identical units of the same product line." Id. § 16A[4][f][iii], at 3B-132.1
(citation omitted). Because it is a deviation from the manufacturer's design that is at
issue, rather than the design itself, the state-of-the-art defense and therefore the
impact of Beshada are inapplicable.
18. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 169-71, 386 A.2d 816, 824-
25 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their
Actionability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 551, 551 (1980); see 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman,
supra note 3, § 16A[4][f][iii], at 3B-132 to -132.1.
19. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429-30, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978); Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 Ill. 2d 434, 439, 396
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products that are properly constructed according to specifications may
still be considered defective. 20 Claims based on design defects may
attack the design of a single component part2' or the finished product
as a whole. 22 A product is defectively designed if the manufacturer
either fails to include an adequate safety device 23 or fails to incorpo-
rate a proper warning regarding the product's dangers. 24
The issue of when a product is "defective" in a design defect case
predicated on strict liability is still unsettled and has been the subject
of continuous debate by both courts and commentators.2 5 Today,
judges routinely borrow terminology from the law of warranty and
negligence when instructing juries as to what constitutes a "defective"
product.26 In design defect cases the use of negligence terminology in
jury charges is seemingly unavoidable because the adequacy of a
product's design necessarily depends upon its reasonableness. 2 7 This
N.E.2d 534, 536-37 (1979); Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, 555, 391 A.2d
1020, 1024-25 (1978). See generally 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, §
16A[4][f][iv], at 3B-132.1 to -136.2(v).
20. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978); Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 Ill. 2d 434, 439, 396
N.E.2d 534, 537 (1979); Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, 555, 391 A.2d 1020,
1024-25 (1978). See generally 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, §
16A[4][f][iv][D], at 3B-136.2.
21. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816
(1978), overruled on other grounds, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81
N.J. 150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979).
22. See, e.g., Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960);
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973);
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
23. See, e.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 157, 406
A.2d 140, 143 (1979); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 488-89, 525
P.2d 1033, 1035 (1974).
24. See, e.g., Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 811 (9th Cir.
1974); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 359 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229, 242-43, 432 A.2d 925, 932 (1981).
25. See, e.g., Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.
1974); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Ulrich
v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976); Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87
N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525
P.2d 1033 (1974); 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, § 16A[4][f][i], at 3B-
126; Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?,
8 S.M.U. L. Rev. 109, 111 (1976).
26. See Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229, 236-37, 432 A.2d 925, 929
(1981); Wade, On The Nature Of Strict Tort Liability For Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 838-41 (1973).
27. See supra note 26. For many years some authorities adhered to the anomalous
view that there was little or no difference between strict liability and negligence in
inadequate warning cases. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978,
994-95 (8th Cir. 1969); Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 49 A.D.2d 250, 252, 373
N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (1925).
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practice has led to confusion over what differences, if any, exist
between strict liability and negligence theories in design defect cases.
The importance of identifying these differences becomes particularly
acute when determining whether certain defenses to a claim of negli-
gence, such as the state-of-the-art defense, are also available to a
defendant in a strict liability case. Successful resolution of such an
issue requires an appreciation of the essential differences between
strict liability and negligence.
B. Negligence vs. Strict Liability
The availability of negligence as a theory of recovery in design
defect cases was accepted long before the advent of strict liability.28
The law of negligence requires that a manufacturer take precautions
to avoid all unreasonable foreseeable risks of harm inhering in the
product's intended use.29 Whether the risk of harm is foreseeable
depends upon what the manufacturer knew or should have known at
the time of marketing.30 Because many courts hold a manufacturer to
the knowledge and skill of an expert with respect to its products, 31 a
manufacturer must not only keep abreast of scientific advances, 32 but
also must perform ongoing investigations of its product in search of
undisclosed risks of harm.33
There can be little doubt as to the availability of the state-of-the-art
defense in a negligence action in which the central issue is whether the
28. See, e.g., Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir. 1930);
Reusch v. Ford Motor Co., 82 P.2d 556, 559 (Wash. 1938); Coakley v. Prentiss-
Wabers Stove Co., 182 Wis. 94, 105-06, 195 N.W. 388, 392 (1923).
29. Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 371, 136 A.2d 626, 632 (1957); Reusch
v. Ford Motor Co., 82 P.2d 556, 558-59 (Wash. 1938); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 398 (1965).
30. Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229, 239, 432 A.2d 925, 930 (1981);
Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 371, 136 A.2d 626, 632 (1957); Reusch v. Ford
Motor Co., 82 P.2d 556, 560 (Wash. 1938); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 398
(1965).
31. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Howard v. Avon Prods., 155 Colo. 444,
454, 395 P.2d 1007, 1011 (1964); Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758, 763
(Mo. 1958); Gielskie v. State, 18 Misc. 2d 508, 510, 191 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (Ct. Cl.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 10 A.D.2d 471, 200 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1960), affd, 9
N.Y.2d 834, 175 N.E.2d 455, 216 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1961).
32. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Gielskie v. State, 18 Misc. 2d 508, 510, 191
N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (Ct. Cl. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 10 A.D.2d 471, 200
N.Y.S.2d 691 (1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 834, 175 N.E.2d 455, 216 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1961);
see Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 371, 136 A.2d 626, 632 (1957); Ferrigno v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 581, 420 A.2d 1305, 1321 (Law Div. 1980).
33. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-90 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of
Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J. 816, 853 (1962).
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defendant knew or should have known of the unreasonable risks and
foreseeable dangers posed by its products.3 4 If the defendant can show
that the dangerous propensities of the product were unknown or
unknowable at the time he placed it into the stream of commerce, he
will not be held responsible for injuries caused by such defects.35
Strict liability, on the other hand, imposes liability for damages
without requiring proof of negligent conduct.3 6 The theory of strict
products liability was first applied in 1963. In Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc. ,37 the Supreme Court of California, in an opin-
ion authored by Justice Traynor, held that a manufacturer who elects
to market a product incurs liability when the article proves to have a
defect that causes personal injury to the user or consumer.38 The
principles of strict liability articulated in Greenman gained wide-
spread acceptance with the adoption of section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts .3 This section would impose liability on the
seller of a defective product that causes injury regardless of the degree
of care exercised by the seller.40 The policy behind section 402A seeks
to place the "burden of accidental injuries caused by products in-
tended for consumption . . .upon those who market them, [to] be
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be
obtained. "41
Viewed from this historical perspective, strict liability was clearly
intended to shift the focus from the defendant's conduct to the prod-
uct. This shift in focus away from the defendant's culpability under-
mines the applicability of the state-of-the-art defense in strict liability
cases.
II. BESHADA: A LOGICAL EXTENSION OF STIcT LIABILITY
Critics have characterized the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision
in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.42 as a radical departure
from accepted principles of strict liability in tort.43 Several New Jersey
34. See Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229, 243-44, 432 A.2d 925, 932-33
(1981). See generally 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, § 12.01[4] (issue of
admissibility of evidence of subsequent accidents not critical because notice or knowl-
edge is more important); id. § 12.01[1] (notice or knowledge of danger is a prerequi-
site to a finding of negligence).
35. See 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, § 8.03[1], at 164-65.
36. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
37. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
38. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
39. 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, §§ 16A[2]-16A[3].
40. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
41. Id. § 402A comment c.
42. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
43. Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 6, at 24; Platt & Platt, supra note 6, at 15;
Berry, supra note 6, at 7. In general, these commentators assert that the Beshada
decision will lead to absolute liability.
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cases predating Beshada, however, recognized the functional and
analytical differences between strict liability and negligence, 44 and
thus demonstrate that the Beshada decision is more accurately de-
scribed as a logical extension of strict liability principles.
A. The New Jersey Trilogy: Cepeda, Suter & Freund
In the seminal case of Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co.,45
the New Jersey Supreme Court responded to the invitation of Dean
Wade to be "forthright in using a tort way of thinking and tort
terminology [in cases of strict liability],"' 46 and began a process of
distinguishing the theories of strict liability and negligence in design
defect cases. In Cepeda, the court adopted the "risk-utility" or
"Wade-Keeton" analysis for determining whether a product is defec-
tively designed for strict liability purposes.4 7
In the first step of the analysis, knowledge of a product's dangerous
condition, as demonstrated at the time of trial, is imputed to the
defendant as a matter of law.48 In the second step, the inquiry is
confined solely to the question whether a reasonably prudent manu-
facturer, possessed of such foreknowledge, would have placed the
product as marketed into the stream of commerce. 49
44. Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229, 243, 432 A.2d 925, 932 (1981);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 158, 406 A.2d 140, 143-44
(1979); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 168, 386 A.2d 816, 823
(1978), overruled on other grounds, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81
N.J. 150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979).
45. 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978), overruled, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979).
46. Wade, supra note 26, at 834; accord Keeton, Product Liability and the
Aleaning of Defect, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30, 37-38 (1973).
47. 76 N.J. at 172-75, 386 A.2d at 825-27.
48. Keeton, supra note 46, at 37-38; see, e.g., Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer
Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812-15 (9th Cir. 1974); Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481
F.2d 252, 256 (5th Cir. 1973); Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 383-85, 549
P.2d 1099, 1107-08 (1976); Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky.
1976); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 163, 386 A.2d 816, 821
(1978), overruled on other grounds, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81
N.J. 150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or.
485, 495-98, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037-39 (1974); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 465,
525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974); Reiger v. Toby Enters., 45 Or. App. 679, 682-83, 609 P.2d
402, 404 (1980); Little v. PPG Indus., 19 Wash. App. 812, 821, 579 P.2d 940, 946
(1978), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979).
49. Dean Wade poses the question as "whether the magnitude of the risk created
by the dangerous condition of the product was outweighed by the social utility
attained by putting it out in this fashion." Wade, supra note 26, at 835. Dean Keeton
poses, with different emphasis, the question as whether "a reasonable person would
conclude that the magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to
be at the time of trial outweighed the benefits of the way the product was so designed
and marketed." Keeton, supra note 46, at 38 (emphasis in original). Under either
807
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Adoption of this two-pronged analysis began the process of distin-
guishing the theories of strict liability and negligence. The critical
distinction is made in the first step by imputing knowledge of the
product's dangerous propensities to the defendant. It thereby relieves
the plaintiff of the burden-imposed on him in a negligence action-
of proving the defendant's knowledge. The function of the second step
is to determine whether the product is "defective." This determination
is reached by weighing the risks of using the product, known at the
time of trial, against the product's utility. 50 If the product's risks
outweigh its utility, the product is considered defective. 51 Although
employing negligence terminology, the second step can more accu-
rately be seen as limiting the tendency of the first step to render a
defendant absolutely liable.
In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co. ,52 the New Jersey
Supreme Court retained the two-pronged Wade-Keeton analysis for
determining whether a product is defectively designed. 53 The Suter
court altered, however, the complexion of the model jury instruction
that the Cepeda court had formulated on the basis of the Wade-
version of the risk-utility analysis, if it is determined that the risks of using the
product outweigh its utility, the product is deemed to be in a "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous" to users or consumers coming into contact with it. Any
injury proximately caused by the so-defined defective product subjects its manufac-
turer to strict liability in tort.
50. Dean Wade outlines seven factors that can be considered in making this
determination:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and
to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product
and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warn-
ings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, supra note 26, at 837-38.
51. Keeton, supra note 46, at 37-38; Wade, supra note 26, at 834-35; accord
Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 172-75, 386 A.2d 816, 825-27 (1978),
overruled on other grounds, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150,
177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979).
52. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
53. Id. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
1983] BESHADA: EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION 809
Keeton analysis. 54 Under the Cepeda instruction, 55 imposition of strict
liability depended on a finding that a product was in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous."5' 6 According to the court in
Suter, this language "appears to impose a greater burden on plaintiff
than is warranted, for it seems to require that plaintiff not only
establish a defect but that in addition the condition created be unrea-
sonably dangerous."' 57 Thus, to avoid the possible misapprehension of
a dual burden of proof, the court held that a jury should be given a
general charge to the effect that "a manufacturer has an obligation to
distribute products which are reasonably fit, suitable and safe for
their intended or foreseeable purposes." 58 Reasonable fitness, suitabil-
ity and safety were still to be measured under the risk-utility analy-
sis.59
The last case in the trilogy of decisions leading to Beshada was
Freund v. Cellofilm Properties.0 Freund squarely presented the issue
whether any meaningful distinction can be made between the theories
of strict liability and negligence. 61 The trial court had ruled that the
strict liability charge in a failure to warn case was superfluous in
conjunction with a negligence charge because "any 'defect' in the
adequacy of the warning would necessarily result from negligence by
the defendant." 2
54. Id. at 174-77, 406 A.2d at 152-53.
55. The instruction reads:
A [product] is [in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous] if it is so
likely to be harmful to persons [or property] that a reasonable prudent
manufacturer [supplier], who had actual knowledge of its harmful charac-
ter would not place it on the market. It is not necessary to find that this
defendant had knowledge of the harmful character of the [product] in order
to determine that it was [unreasonably dangerous].
76 N.J. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827 (quoting Wade, supra note 26, at 839-40). This
instruction was subsequently modified in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
81 N.J. 150, 174-76, 406 A.2d 140, 152-53 (1979).
56. 76 N.J. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827.
57. 81 N.J. at 175, 406 A.2d at 152.
58. Id. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,
501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), the California Supreme Court also
eliminated the terminology "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" from its
model jury charge. Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443. The court
was concerned that the language might have a tendency to confuse the jury into
believing that there exists a dual burden of proof in a design defect case. Such a
burden would require that the plaintiff not only establish the existence of a defect,
but also that the condition created be "unreasonably dangerous." Id. at 133, 501
P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
59. 81 N.J. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
60. 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
61. Id. at 236, 432 A.2d at 929.
62. Id. at 235-36, 432 A.2d at 928.
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On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court seized the opportunity
to synthesize its holdings in Cepeda and Suter. The court focused on
step one of the risk-utility analysis, and stated that it contained the
essential difference between the two approaches to liability: "[U]nder
strict liability, the seller's knowledge is presumed; it is 'assume[d] the
seller knew of the product's propensity to injure as it did.' . . . In
negligence cases, such knowledge must be proved; the standard is
what the manufacturer 'knew or should have known.' "63
In adopting the risk-utility analysis, the Freund court clearly re-
jected any notion that a plaintiff is required to prove that the manu-
facturer of the product knew or should have known of its danger.
Rather, the court held, trial courts must charge juries that knowledge
of the dangerous trait of a product is imputed to the manufacturer
without regard to unforeseeable dangers or prevailing industry stand-
ards at the time a defective product was injected into the stream of
commerce.
64
B. Beshada and its Progeny
In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. ,65 the New Jersey
Supreme Court relied on the risk-utility analysis to strike the defend-
ants' state-of-the-art defense.68 The complaint alleged that the asbes-
63. Id. at 239, 432 A.2d at 930 (citation omitted).
64. Id. at 242-43, 432 A.2d at 932. Prior to Freund, a Washington appellate
court, in Little v. PPG Indus., 19 Wash. App. 812, 579 P.2d 940 (1978), affd as
modified on other grounds, 92 Wash. 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979), similarly held that
the degree of care exercised by a manufacturer or the foreseeability of the dangers
involved in the use of a product are not relevant factors in a strict liability case based
upon a manufacturer's failure to warn. Id. at 822, 579 P.2d at 947. Notably, the
holdings of both Little and Freund are inapposite to comment j of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Comment j imposes a duty to warn on the manufac-
turer when the manufacturer knows or should know of a product's dangers. Com-
ment j's suggestion, however, that strict liability is based upon the manufacturer's
knowledge or reasonable imputation of knowledge is inconsistent with the basic
premise underlying strict liability because it shifts the emphasis away from the
condition of the product and back to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's
conduct. See Little v. PPG Indus., 19 Wash. App. 812, 821, 579 P.2d 940, 946
(1978), af-'d as modified on other grounds, 92 Wash. 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979). Thus,
while § 402A pays lip service to strict liability in failure to warn cases, comment j in
fact expresses a negligence standard (fault requirements) that is clearly incongruous
with strict liability principles. Id.; see Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229, 236-
41, 432 A.2d 925, 929-31 (1981).
65. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
66. Id. at 199-205, 447 A.2d at 544-47. Notably, in some cases Beshada has
proven to be a two-edged sword for plaintiffs seeking punitive damages. See Wolf v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 82-130 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 1982); Cold v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 553 F. Supp. 482 (D.N.J. 1982). In both Wolf and Cold the courts
stated that because Beshada eliminates all notions of culpability or fault from a strict
liability case, a punitive damage award is unavailable. This reading of Beshada is too
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tos dust inhaled by the plaintiffs while working with products manu-
factured and distributed by the defendants caused them various types
of pulmonary injuries.6 7 The plaintiffs sought compensatory damages
under the theory of strict liability in tort for the defendants' failure to
warn of the health hazards posed by the products containing asbes-
tos.68
The defendants asserted the state-of-the-art defense to the obliga-
tion to warn. 9 They argued that prior to 1964 no conclusive scientific
or medical evidence indicated that a health hazard existed for those
working with asbestos-containing products.7 0 Thus, the Beshada de-
fendants contended, they were not obligated to warn of hazards
unknown, and more importantly, "unknowable," at the time their
products were placed into the stream of commerce).1
Prior to trial, the plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the state-of-the-
art defense, relying primarily on the Freund decision. The trial court
denied the plaintiff's motion . 2 To reach this conclusion it reasoned
that the imputation to defendants of knowledge of the product's dan-
gerous propensities as manifested at the time of trial did not amount to
an irrebuttable presumption.7 3 Defendants have the right, according
to the trial court, to introduce evidence that they did not have knowl-
edge of the product's danger at the time of manufacture because at
that time the danger was not "known to the world. '74
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding
that the state-of-the-art defense is incompatible with the principles of
strict liability in design defect cases.7 5 The court stated:
Essentially, [the] state-of-the-art [defense] is a negligence defense.
It seeks to explain why defendants are not culpable for failing to
provide a warning. [Defendants] assert, in effect, that because they
could not have known the product was dangerous, they acted
reasonably in marketing it without a warning. But in strict liability
restrictive. Arguably, a punitive damage award is consistent with Beshada to the
extent that it tends to encourage manufacturers to take greater care in marketing
their product. On the other hand, the Beshada court never purported to rely on the
policies underlying punitive damage awards-punishment and deterrence-as a ba-
sis for its holding. In addition to proving that he has a right to compensatory damages
when injured by a defective product, an injured plaintiff should also have the
opportunity to prove that the defendant's acts were malicious or willful and wanton
so as to justify an award of punitive damages.
67. 90 N.J. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542.
68. Id. at 196-97, 447 A.2d at 542.
69. Id. at 197, 447 A.2d at 542-43.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 199, 447 A.2d at 543.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 202-09, 447 A.2d at 545-49.
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cases, culpability is irrelevant. The product was unsafe. That it was
unsafe because of the state of technology does not change the fact
that it was unsafe. Strict liability focuses on the product, not the
fault of the manufacturer. 76
The Beshada court explained that its holding is consistent with the
risk-spreading policy upon which the doctrine of strict liability in tort
is based.77 The court reasoned that by imposing liability upou the
manufacturer as opposed to the innocent plaintiff, "the costs of the
product will be borne by those who profit from it: the manufacturers
and distributors who profit from its sale and the buyers who profit
from its use."'78 The court further commented that its decision would
encourage better research and development: 79 "The 'state-of-the-art'
at a given time is partly determined by how much industry invests in
safety research. By imposing on manufacturers the costs of failure to
discover hazards, we create an incentive for them to invest more
actively in safety research.
80
The Beshada court also noted that in addition to spreading the loss
and encouraging safety research, its holding would simplify the fact-
finding process for jurors.8 ' The court explained that its decision
would avoid confusing and costly battles, common to negligence
actions, among experts who debate the "scientific knowability" of a
product's dangers at the time it was marketed.8 2 Finally, the court
expressed its concern that the state-of-the-art defense might lead the
jury to believe that fault, not the condition of the product, was at
issue. 83
While the court expressly limited its holding to failure to warn
cases, it intimated in a footnote 4 that the defense would also be
unavailable in a defective design case based upon the manufacturer's
failure to include a safety device. Since Beshada, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chemical Corp.,s5
76. Id. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 205-06, 447 A.2d at 547.
78. Id. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547.
79. Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 207-08, 447 A.2d at 548-49.
82. Id. "Scientific knowability," according to the Beshada court,
refers not to what in fact was known at the time, but to what could have
been known at the time. In other words, even if no scientist had actually
formed the belief that asbestos was dangerous, the hazards would be
deemed "knowable" if a scientist could have formed that belief by applying
research or performing tests that were available at the time.
Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548 (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at 208, 447 A.2d at 548.
84. Id. at 204 n.6, 447 A.2d at 546 n.6.
85. 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179 (1982).
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strengthened the inference that it would disallow the state-of-the-art
defense in all other design defect cases if given the opportunity to so
rule. In Michalko, the court applied the principles set forth in Beshada
to a case involving the failure to incorporate a safety device into an
industrial machine.86 Citing Beshada, the court reiterated the now
well-established axiom that in a design defect case, knowledge of the
product's .dangerous propensities is imputed to the manufacturer.17
Because the availability of the state-of-the-art defense was not an issue
in Michalko, the court did not specifically preclude the assertion of the
defense in a design defect case. 8 This would appear, however, to be
the next logical step for the New Jersey Supreme Court to take.
Indeed, one court has expressly taken this step. In Carter v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp. ,89 the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Texas interpreted Texas law and expressly held that the
state-of-the-art defense is unavailable in a strict products liability case
based on design defects.90 Interestingly, however, its interpretation of
Texas law required it to hold that the defense was available in failure
to warn cases. 91
The unavailability of the state-of-the-art defense will have its great-
est impact in toxic tort cases like Beshada, in which the plaintiff's
injury does not manifest itself until some time after the first exposure
to the defective product. For example, in Wolf v. Proctor & Gamble
Co.,92 the United States District Court of New Jersey applied Beshada
in an action brought by a woman who had developed toxic shock
syndrome allegedly as a result of using "Rely" tampons.9 3 The defend-
ants in Wolf argued that they had no duty to warn of the dangers they
were unaware of at the time of marketing.94 The court used Beshada
to strike the defendant's state-of-the-art defense with respect to the
strict liability claim, but allowed the defense to rebut the negligence
86. Id. at 394-95, 451 A.2d at 183.
87. Id.
88. In Michalko, the court held that "an independent contractor who undertakes
to rebuild part of a machine in accordance with the specifications of the owner can
be held strictly liable for breach of its legal duty to... make the machine safe or to
warn of the dangers inherent in its use." Id. at 403, 451 A.2d at 187-88. Interestingly,
the court left open the issue whether placing adequate warnings on a machine would
constitute a factual or legal defense to a claim of strict liability based on the failure to
manufacture or rebuild an otherwise safe machine. Id. at 403 n.5, 451 A.2d at 187
n.5.
89. 51 U.S.L.W. 2552 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 1983).
90. Id. at 2553.
91. Id. The court cited Beshada with approval, stating that New Jersey, unlike
Texas, had brought "the failure to warn case in line with other strict liability cases."
Id.
92. No. 82-130 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 1982).
93. Id. slip op. at 1, 3-4.
94. Id. at 1-2.
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claim.95 It is equally conceivable that Beshada could appropriately be
applied in the widely publicized formaldehyde and Agent Orange
litigation. Two respected commentators have opined that the logic of
Beshada would allow recovery for the first time even in cases brought
against cigarette manufacturers for the diseases caused by the use of
their tobacco products. 96
The logical extension of strict liability principles in Beshada was
neither surprising nor revolutionary. Its significance is heightened
when considered in light of the fact that "New Jersey, along with
California, has [in recent years] set the trend in most important
developments in products liability law."'9 7 The New Jersey Supreme
Court's preeminent role in the evolution of products liability law is
likely to render its decision in Beshada, and more importantly, its
practical implications, subject to close scrutiny by courts and com-
mentators.
III. Is BESHADA OR STRICT LIABILITY AT FAULT?
Notwithstanding its relative youth, the Beshada decision has elic-
ited much comment." Certain critics of the decision have contended
that if the danger was unknowable at the time of marketing, it is
inconsistent to label a product defective at that time on the basis of
knowledge subsequently obtained. 9 This argument finds some sup-
port in the court's own analysis. Two tests were suggested for deter-
mining if a product is defective: "(1) does its utility outweigh its risk?
and (2) if so, has that risk been reduced to the greatest extent possible
consistent with the product's utility?"'00 Thus, the critics note, the
court seemingly contradicts itself by declaring that a manufacturer is
liable for marketing a defective product regardless of its ability to
know of the dangers while at the same time defining a defective
product as one that has not been made safe to the "greatest extent
possible." 101
95. Id. at 3-4.
96. 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, § 16A[4][f], at 3B-155 to -156.
To date, there is no record of a plaintiff prevailing on this type of case within the 50
states. Id.
97. Platt & Platt, supra note 6, at 15, col. 4; see, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.,
20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Cepeda v. Cumberland
Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Suter v.
San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
98. See supra note 6.
99. Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 6, at 24, col. 4.
100. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 201, 447 A.2d 539, 545
(1982).
101. Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 6, at 24, col. 4.
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According to the Beshada court, however, these two tests merely
"explain the role of state-of-the-art in strict liability cases. In actual-
ity, the only test for product safety is whether the benefit outweighs
the risk."' 02 Thus, although knowledge of safer alternatives at the
time of manufacture is certainly a factor in determining whether a
product's risks outweigh its utility, the unavailability of such knowl-
edge does not constitute a complete defense to a strict liability
claim. 103 By imputing knowledge that was unavailable at the time of
marketing, the trier of fact is able to make an objective determination
of the product's actual dangerousness without interference from mis-
leading negligence concepts. 04
Another, more significant criticism of Beshada is that its practical
effect is to impose "absolute" liability on manufacturers. 10 5 This per-
ception, however, is incorrect. Rather than imposing strict liability
merely because the product caused injury, the Beshada court would
impose liability only if the risk of the product outweighed its utility. 06
Thus, removing the state-of-the-art defense from the defendant's arse-
nal does not render him powerless. In all design defect cases, the
defendant may escape liability if it can demonstrate that, as mar-
keted, the product's utility outweighed its risk. To do so, the defend-
ant has the opportunity to demonstrate that it would have been
impossible to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
either incurring undue expense or destroying the product's useful-
ness. 07 Concededly, in cases in which it is the absence of a warning
that renders the product defective, the value of this particular defense
may be more theoretical than real, as placing a warning on a product
is an easy task and will seldom detract from the product's utility. 0 8
Even in these situations, however, the defendant may escape liability
if it can prove that "under the technological capabilities existing at the
time the product was marketed, it was unfeasible to include a warn-
ing on the product." 109
102. 90 N.J. at 201 n.4, 447 A.2d at 545 n.4.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546.
105. Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 6, at 24, col. 1; Platt & Platt, supra note 6,
at 18, col. 3. According to the Platts," '[d]efective' has now achieved a new mean-
ing. It can be defined simply as 'a product which causes injury.'" Id.
106. 90 N.J. at 201, 447 A.2d at 545.
107. See Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. 2552, 2553 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 1, 1983).
108. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 202, 447 A.2d 539, 545
(1982); see Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 402, 451 A.2d
179, 187 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Props., 87 N.J. 229, 238, 432 A.2d 925, 929
(1981).




Moreover, even after Beshada, the plaintiff must still prove that the
product was defective and capable of producing the injuries in-
curred."10 In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defend-
ant's product was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries."'
Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defect existed when
the product was distributed by and under the control of the defend-
ant. 112
Therefore, rather than imposing absolute liability on a manufac-
turer, Beshada correctly removes one of the vestiges of negligence and
advances the goals and policies of strict liability. "To permit the
defendant to defeat a strict liability claim by proving that it could not
have foreseen the danger, in effect by proving that it was not negli-
gent, would fly in the face of the entire history of strict liability." 1 3
Another criticism of Beshada suggests that "[t]he fundamental flaw
[in the decision] is that it utilizes the general [principle] of strict
liability-to protect consumers from defective products-as a justifi-
cation for emasculating the requirement that the product be defective
before liability results.""14 This assertion unwittingly highlights what
the critics' polemics otherwise obscure-rather than emasculating the
requirement, Beshada merely applied it in accordance with the legal
principles governing the cause of action asserted. Beshada was by no
means the first case in which the focus of strict products liability was
shifted from the fault of the tortfeasor to the safety of the consumer." 5
Apparently, then, it is the policy of strict liability itself, not Beshada,
to which these critics object.
Given the academic nature of the defenses available in design defect
cases premised on inadequate warning, the critics may not be incor-
rect in maintaining that Beshada, as a practical matter, decrees abso-
lute liability when a plaintiff establishes all the elements of a prima
facie case. Even so, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Beshada is an aberration from the principles of strict liability. In fact,
110. Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 394, 451 A.2d 179,
183 (1982).
111. For a discussion of causation or proximate cause in strict products liability
actions, see Comment, Products Liability- The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence,
and Strict Liability, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1350, 1375-77 (1966).
112. Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 394, 451 A.2d 179,
183 (1982); Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 590-91, 326 A.2d 673, 677
(1974).
113. Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. 2552, 2553 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 1, 1983).
114. Platt & Platt, supra note 6, at 18, col. 4.
115. E.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 169, 406 A.2d
140, 149 (1979); see 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, § 16A[4][f][iv][A], at
3B-136.2(g) to -136.2(h); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g (1965).
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one court has stated that Beshada "has brought the failure to warn
case in line with other strict liability cases." 1 6
Beshada's solicitude for the injured plaintiff may well comport with
the intentions of those instrumental in the development of strict liabil-
ity. Justice Traynor, in his concurrence to Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co. ,", stated that "it should now be recognized that a manufac-
turer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on
the market ... proves to have a defect that causes injury to human
beings."" 8 In 1957, Professor James similarly stated that "[s]trict
liability is to be preferred over a system of liability based on fault
wherever you have an enterprise or activity, beneficial to many,
which takes a more or less inevitable accident toll of human life and
limb.""" In light of these and other similar expressions of the policies
of strict liability, 20 it could be argued that Beshada actually falls short
of implementing these objectives.
CONCLUSION
The debate concerning the proper limits of strict liability, or
whether strict products liability should exist at all, is far from over.
The Beshada decision, however, should not be viewed as a revolution-
ary decision in this debate. Rather, in proper perspective, Beshada is
merely a logical consequence of the policies of strict liability. Critics
who so vehemently denounce this decision are, in reality, attacking
the very foundation of strict products liability. Acknowledgement of
this underlying fact is essential to resolution of the difficult questions
of policy that must be confronted.
116. Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. 2552, 2553 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 1, 1983).
117. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
118. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
119. James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negli-
gence?, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 923, 923 (1957).
120. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
Yale L.J. 1055 (1972) (suggesting that the only issue is which party is the better risk-
bearer); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973) (suggesting
that causation is the only issue).
